Claude Desktop turned into a C2 agent via configuration poisoning

Pentera Labs red team researchers achieved remote code execution on a developer machine using Claude Desktop. The entry point was a compromised email account linked to a Claude profile.
The attackers injected a base64-encoded instruction into the Claude personal settings. Because these settings sync across all devices and sessions, the poisoned prompt loaded silently in the background upon app launch. If the victim had Desktop Commander or another MCP connector installed, Claude executed a reverse shell. Otherwise, it displayed a fake error message with a link prompting the user to download a malicious utility.
Anthropic stated that personal settings, skills, and MCP connectors execute code by design and this is not a vulnerability. The researchers recommend running agents in a sandbox and monitoring changes to synced configuration files.
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